Common Ownership, Domestic Competition, and Export: Evidence from Thailand
We use administrative data of all registered firms in Thailand, both public and private, to study the relationships between common ownership, market power, and firms’ export behaviors. Our results suggest that firms in ownership networks tend to have higher market power as measured by markup. In addition, markup is negatively associated with a firm’s propensity to export, its likelihood of product upgrade, and the chance of survival in foreign markets. Our findings have policy implications on antitrust regulations and competitiveness policies, especially in export-oriented economies dominated by powerful business conglomerates.
Digital Thailand: Analyzing the Impact of Broadband Connectivity on Firm Productivity
Using a large dataset of almost 100,000 manufacturing establishments in Thailand, this paper studies the impact of broadband internet connectivity on firms’ total factor productivity (TFP). The author finds that, for micro-, small-, and medium-sized enterprises, broadband adoption can raise productivity by 23% to 54%. These results support the government’s policies in building the country’s broadband infrastructure. Although the results reveal substantial benefits of broadband adoption, especially for smaller-sized firms, only about 30% of firms reported adopting broadband or having any types of ICT investments. Perhaps, more could be done to encourage broadband adoptions and private ICT investments for firms of all sizes.
The Movement and Change in Online Price Within and Across Selected Major Retail Stores in Thailand
E-commerce has gained larger market shares in Thailand over the last decade. Yet there is a paucity of studies on online price behaviour and movement. This project is one of the first attempts to explore this topic in the Thai context. Using web scraping technique to acquire the data on price and product information from major retailers that have both physical and online outlets, this paper summarizes its findings into six stylized facts. In short, online price changes more frequent than its offline counterpart, yet the magnitudes of changes are generally much larger. Further, price heterogeneity exists across stores and product categories. However, pricing strategies of the same store seems to differ between its online and offline outlets.
The Social Cost of Thailand’s Transportation Fuel Pricing Policy
The price structure of Thailand’s transportation fuels has always been heavily distorted by the government. The prices of diesel and biofuels are consistently subsidized, while the prices of other fuels are raised above their competitive level in order to provide cross-subsidies to diesel and biofuels. Price distortion in this fashion leads to over- /under-consumption of transportation fuels relative to the socially optimal level. This study estimates the economic and social cost of the price distortions within Thailand’s transportation fuel market that stem from inecient price structure and cross subsidies.
Optimal Environmental Policies and Renewable Energy Investment in Electricity Markets
Renewable electricity subsidies have been popular policy instruments to combat climate change because of their ability to offset emissions. This paper studies the long-run welfare benefits of optimizing the design of the existing renewable energy subsidy (the status quo) in the presence of heterogeneity in the offset emissions. In particular, I measure the welfare gain from differentiating renewable subsidies across location and time to reflect the environmental benefits from offseting emissions. Ifind that the welfare gain from differentiation is small compared to the gain already achieved under the status quo subsidy. In contrast, the optimal emissions tax yields much larger welfare gain because it engages in other cost-effective emissions abatement channels that renewable energy subsidies do not: namely, demand conservation and cross-plant fuel substitution.
Observability and Endogenous Organizations
This paper establishes a relationship between the observability of common shocks and optimal organizational design in a multiagent moral hazard environment. We consider two types of organizations, namely relative-performace and cooperative regimes, and show that, with sufficient information regarding common shocks, a cooperative organization can be optimal even if outputs are highly correlated. The model is then embedded in a Walrasian general equilibrium model in which choices regarding organizations and investment in information on common shocks are jointly determined. Numerical results reveal that both cooperative and relative-performance regimes can coexist in equilibrium but only cooperative organizations invest in full observability of common shocks. Changes in the cost of information and aggregate wealth can affect substantially the types of organizations operating and the matching patterns of heterogeneous agents in these organizations. General equilibrium effects are key in determining how information costs impact the way production is organized.