Myths and Facts about Inequalities in Thailand

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








Unequal opportunities




Unequal opportunities


Unequal income


Human Capital Employment Job choices

Income


Earnings
Transfer income
Capital income













- **☐** What drive the changes in income & consumption inequalities?
- **☐** Would the picture change post-Covid 19?

Officially: income and consumption inequalities have declined



Source: NESDC calculated from Household Socio-Economic Survey (SES)


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


Source: NESDC calculated from Household Socio-Economic Survey (SES)

Household surveys under-sample top 1%.

Adding tax data does not reverse the trend






Source: NESDC calculated from Household Socio-Economic Survey (SES)

Source: Jenmana (2018) calculated from combining SES with tax data

Robustness of declining income inequality



Source: Authors calculated from SES

Drivers behind 'declining income inequality' are concerning and unsustainable.

Data

I. On income & consumption inequalities

Annual SES: 1988-2019


- Household level
- Unit: real value at 2000

 adjusted to per adult per month

II. On Covid-19 impact


Quarterly LFS: 2019-2020

Individual-level




- **☐** What drive the changes in income & consumption inequalities?
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Total income inequality declined for all ages



The P90/P10 percentile ratio of total income

For each age group, income components differ



More public transfer policies More households relying on transfers

Public transfer programs

- Elderly allowance
- Disability allowance

Shares of households by main sources of income


1988-1990

Main source of income	Earnings	Transfer & Pension
Age 55-59	92%	7%
Age 60-64	88%	10%
Age 65-69	84%	15%

2017-2019


Main source of income	Earnings	Transfer & Pension
Age 55-59	87%	12%
Age 60-64	72%	27%
Age 65-69	61%	37%

Counterfactual experiments if transfer components were removed




The P90/P10 percentile ratio

Removing public transfer, inequality would slightly increase




The P90/P10 percentile ratio

Removing public & private transfer, inequality would largely increase



The P90/P10 percentile ratio


Regressive role of current pension system



The P90/P10 percentile ratio

Pension concentrated in rich households

Shares of households 55+ years old with pension




Source: SES (household-level): 2017-2019


Fact #1:

Transfer income keeps total income inequality stable for older households.

Sources of household earnings have changed over time




Earnings inequality



The P90/P10 percentile ratio

Inequality increased among farming HHs, but declined among non-farming



The P90/P10 percentile ratio

Fact #2:

Earnings inequality among farming households:

Share of farming households:

Earnings inequality among non-farming households:





Earnings inequality declined among prime-age (25-54)




Hidden Fact 1:

Source: SES (household-level)

Poor farming households:

large share of earnings is in-kind → less liquidity

Earnings component of farming households




Income group

28


Hidden Fact 2: Earnings inequality among non-farming declined but slow growth of middle and high school earnings

Non-farming households: age 25-54



change in shares


	1988	2019	Change
Primary	63%	33%	-30
Middle school	11%	17%	+6
High school	9%	28%	+19
Voc./ College	16%	20%	+4




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Expenditure components (2017-2019)






Fact 3: the poor less able to absorb shocks



	Bottom 20	Middle 60	Top 20
% essential spending	81%	75%	66%


Low income has low education investment



	Bottom 20	Middle 60	Top 20
% education	0.7%	1.1%	1.6%

Poor households have more children, yet spend less

Average number of children age (0-14) per household





Source: SES (household-level): head age 25-54 years old

Poor households have more children, yet spend less

Average number of children age (0-14) per household

Median education spending per child







Source: SES (household-level): head age 25-54 years old

Low income more exposed to covid-19 shocks?





	Bottom 20	Middle 60	Top 20
% telecom	2.5%	3.5%	3.7%



- ☐ What drive the changes in income & consumption inequalities?
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Employment impact

	2019q1	2019q2	2020q1	2020q2
In labor force:	37,795,296	37,891,141	37,559,172	37,548,286
Employment No.	37,444,158	37,514,203	37,165,400	36,803,120
	99.07%	99.01%	98.95%	98.02%
Employed with zero hours	551,543	428,066	649,137	2,509,266
	1.47%	1.14%	1.75%	6.82%
Average weekly hours (>0)	41.5	43.2	41.1	40.6

- Mild decline in labor force size and employment rate
- Big jump in employed with zero hours
- Average weekly hours dropped

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
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- **Big jump** in employed with zero hours
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Measuring the pandemic effect by Difference in Difference (DID)

% Employed with zero hours



1. Control for seasonal

$$(Y_{2020,Q2} - Y_{2019,Q2})$$

2. Remove macro time trend

$$(Y_{2020,Q1} - Y_{2019,Q1})$$

Pandemic effect =
$$(Y_{2020,Q2} - Y_{2019,Q2}) - (Y_{2020,Q1} - Y_{2019,Q1})$$

Pandemic effect

	2019q1	2019q2	2020q1	2020q2	DID
In labor force:	37,795,296	37,891,141	37,559,172	37,548,286	-106,731
Employment No.	37,444,158	37,514,203	37,165,400	36,803,120	-432,325
	99.07%	99.01%	98.95%	98.02%	-0.87%
Employed with zero hours	551,543	428,066	649,137	2,509,266	1,983,606
	1.47%	1.14%	1.75%	6.82%	5.40%
Average weekly hours (>0)	41.5	43.2	41.1	40.6	-2.1

Who are the additional 5.4% employed with zero hours?

Pre-pandemic

- Over 70% in agriculture
- 70% self-employed
- 50% in Northeast







Seasonal workers

Mid-pandemic


- 30% in sales/services
- 46% are employees
- More in BKK and Phuket






Lockdown workers

Overall weekly hour by industry and work status





Controls: region, occupation, age, education

Overall weekly hour effects by education

	Employee (18.38 mil)	Self-employed (18.37 mil)
Primary	-4.98	-2.92
Middle	-6.25	-4.34
Highschool	-4.60	-4.84
VC/college	-4.16	-5.55

Controls: region, occupation, industry, age

- Similar effects (3-6 hours).
- Most negative effect: middle school employees.

Earnings are observed only for employees


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Controls: region, occupation, industry, age

- Similar effects (3-6 hours).
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Earnings are observed only for employees

- Hours reduced but most workers still reported positive earnings.
- Among lockdown workers: 46,000 had zero earnings.



	Monthly (12.3 mil)		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			y/daily mil)
	Positive	Positive Zero		Zero		
	hour hour		hour	hour		
Primary	-0.7%	-6.8%	-6.0%	-8.9%		
Middle	-0.5%	-6.7%	-0.8%	-3.7%		
Highschool	0.0%	-6.1%	-2.3%	-5.1%		
VC/college	0.1% -6.1%		1.2%	-1.6%		

- Lockdown workers are more affected
- Particularly the case for primary educated with non-monthly pay

	Month (12.3 r	•		y/daily mil)
	Positive	Zero	Positive	Zero
	hour hour		hour	hour
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	Monthly (12.3 mil)		•		Hourly/dail [,] (5.9 mil)	
	Positive	Positive Zero		e Zero		
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VC/college	0.1%	-6.1%	1.2%	-1.6%

- High paid workers not affected
- Earnings inequality among employees slightly increased in the short-run
- U shape or L shape?

Conclusions & Policy implications

Facts on income & consumption inequalities in Thailand

#1 Transfer keeps Inequality stable among older households

Facts on income & consumption inequalities in Thailand

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- #2 Aggregate earnings inequality masks hidden problems
 - the left behind poor farmers
 - stagnant earnings of high school graduates

Facts on income & consumption inequalities in Thailand

#1 Transfer keeps Inequality stable among older households

- #2 Aggregate earnings inequality masks hidden problems
 - the left behind poor farmers
 - stagnant earnings of high school graduates

- #3 Poor are vulnerable to shock
 - unable to adjust consumption
 - higher risk of employment loss

Which restructuring do we need?

#1 Transfer keeps Inequality stable among older households

Transfer is uncertain: living longer & fewer children

affected by children's earnings loss

Restructure the system for households to be more self-reliant at old age

- More work opportunities for older workers
- Retirement income policy (sufficient, inclusive, fiscal sustainable)

Which restructuring do we need?

- #2 Aggregate earnings inequality masks hidden problems
 - left behind poor farmers
 - stagnant earnings of high school graduates

Productivity problem

Re-investigate lessons from the past & start experimental mind-set

- Village fund (Kabowski & Townsend, 2011)
- Farmers & technology (Chantarat et al., 2019)
- Education system (Kilenthong, 2017)

Which restructuring do we need?


#3 Poor are vulnerable to shock


- unable to adjust consumption
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Data revolution (safety net for all requires all in the system)


- Normal time: welfare & taxes; updated information
- Crisis time: timely response, accurate, no exclusion error


Focusing on reducing income & consumption inequalities alone is insufficient






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




To reduce intergeneration transmission, more interventions are needed.



Thailand's wealth inequality is starkly larger than income inequality (even among the bottom 99%)



Wealth

Income

Consumption

Tackling inequalities is never easy. The longer we wait, the more we pay.

