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Trade Theory with Behavioral Agents*

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Abstract

I develop a theoretical framework to study gains from trade and optimal tariffs in the presence of behavioral biases. I introduce a sufficient statistic, called “behavioral wedge,” that generalizes the model to capture various types of behavioral biases, including utility misperceptions and inattention. First, I explore how behavioral biases influence gains from trade, demonstrating potential welfare losses from trade for behavioral agents. Second, I characterize optimal tariffs and behavioral nudges in the presence of behavioral biases. I show that small open economies can leverage trade policy to mitigate the welfare losses from behavioral biases, whereas larger economies might use nudges to manipulate the world’s terms of trade. Finally, I discuss the role of behavioral biases in shaping public support for the 2018 China–United States trade war and Brexit.

Keywords: trade theory, behavioral economics, gains from trade, optimal tariffs, nudges.

JEL classification numbers: D9, F1, H2

*I thank Emmanuel Farhi for a helpful conversation. All remaining errors are mine.

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1 Introduction

In recent years, pivotal events such as the 2018 China–United States trade war and the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union, commonly referred to as Brexit, have sparked intense debate and scrutiny regarding the public’s skeptical stance toward international trade. While traditional economic theories suggest that trade liberalization generally yields net positive benefits, a persistent question lingers: Why does a significant portion of the population remain opposed to international trade? Conventional explanations, such as the distributional effects of trade and pressures on the job market, certainly play a role, as highlighted by findings in Stantcheva (2023). However, this paper proposes that one possible explanation lies in behavioral economics, specifically in the behavioral biases distorting consumers’ perceptions of the benefits and costs of international trade and tariffs.

This paper argues that behavioral biases might significantly influence consumers’ understanding and acceptance of welfare gains from trade and the welfare costs of tariffs. For instance, consumers who are habitually inclined towards certain consumption patterns, default to known products, or display a bias for domestic goods may not fully capitalize on the economic advantages of cheaper imported goods, thus failing to recognize the full extent of gains from trade. Similarly, consumers who are inattentive to the nuances of tariffs may disproportionately weigh perceived job risks, opting for trade policies that inefficiently protect domestic employment. Such choices, however, are often made without a full understanding of the welfare losses incurred through tariffs, which can lead to higher prices and reduced social welfare.

This paper advances standard international trade theory by integrating insights from behavioral economics, focusing on gains from trade and optimal tariffs in the presence of behavioral biases. Leveraging a unified framework based on Farhi and Gabaix (2020), I explore the impact of various behavioral biases from misperceptions in preferences and prices. These include consumption habits, home biases, environmental externality, internality, addiction, and myopia for utility misperceptions, and inattention to prices, bounded memory, and left-digit bias for price misperceptions. By comparing the decisions of rational and behavioral agents, the study sheds light on how behavioral biases reshape traditional trade theories.

By introducing a “behavioral wedge” as a sufficient statistic for the extent of behavioral biases in agents’ decisions, I reformulate Roy’s identity to account for the welfare effects of price changes in the presence of behavioral biases. The behavioral version of Roy’s identity decomposes the total welfare impact into two components: (i) the direct effect, as identified by traditional Roy’s identity, and (ii) the indirect effect, unique to behavioral agents and captured by the behavioral wedge. The latter reflects a substitution effect that is absent under rational agents—an insight from the envelope theorem. This indirect effect represents how behavioral agents change their consumption differently from rational agents.

Exploring welfare gains from trade under behavioral biases reveals that these biases can either magnify or diminish welfare gains, potentially leading to welfare losses. For example, cheaper imported sugar could amplify the welfare loss from sugar overconsumption when the agents fail

to internalize health costs associated with excessive sugar consumption. Thus, the welfare gains from sugar imports could be smaller than traditionally considered or even be negative.

Furthermore, I propose a theory of optimal tariffs for behavioral agents, extending Johnson's (1953) optimal tariff theory with behavioral biases. This introduces a term for agents' misoptimization discrepancies, allowing tariffs to address not only terms-of-trade effects but also inefficiencies resulting from behavioral biases. The paper also proposes "nudges" as a policy instrument targeting behavioral biases and characterizes the optimal nudges and tariffs to provide a more nuanced understanding of trade policy in the context of behavioral economics. Even in the absence of behavioral biases, nudges remain welfare-improving by influencing the world's terms of trade. The model also provides a rationale for the use of tariffs in small open economies as a corrective mechanism against welfare losses from behavioral biases.

The main contribution of this paper is to integrate behavioral economics and international economics. Despite the growth of behavioral economics, the theory of behavioral agents has yet to be fully developed in the context of international trade. The field of international trade is known for its rigorous and complex models, with a central assumption that all agents behave rationally. These models typically depict consumers as capable of accurately determining their consumption and responding appropriately to price changes resulting from trade liberalization.

Some studies have indicated the presence of behavioral biases in this field. For instance, Freund and Ozden (2008) emphasize the importance of loss aversion and reference dependence in shaping people's preferences over trade policy. Tovar (2009) finds that loss aversion can explain the trade protections afforded to declining industries and the existence of an anti-trade bias in trade policy. Grossman and Helpman (2021) study equilibrium tariffs with social identification.

Furthermore, this paper extends the behavioral public finance framework to analyze import taxes, a relatively underexplored area compared to the more commonly studied income, sales, and sin taxes. Farhi and Gabaix (2020) investigate Ramsey and Pigou commodity taxes and Mirrlees non-linear income tax in the presence of behavioral biases. Chetty (2009) and Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2009) explore the salience effects of commodity taxes, while Mullainathan, Schwartzstein, and Congdon (2012) introduce a reduced-form approach to evaluate optimal taxes in various settings. O'Donoghue and Rabin (2006) study optimal sin taxes in the presence of self-control problems. Gruber and Koszegi (2001) focus on optimal cigarette taxes in light of externalities. Allcott, Lockwood, and Taubinsky (2019) and Dubois, Griffith, and O'Connell (2020) study optimal soda tax in the presence of overconsumption. Allcott, Mullainathan, and Taubinsky (2014) analyze optimal energy tax with externalities and internalities. Baicker, Mullainathan, and Schwartzstein (2015) study the optimal design problems in health insurance under behavioral biases and moral hazard problems.

The third aspect is related to perceptions related to the effects of trade liberalization. Hiscox (2006) shows that giving respondents information about job losses due to trade decreases their support for free trade; telling them that trade reduces prices does not change their views. Alfaro et al. (2023) show that telling respondents about research findings on the job losses or gains from

trade or price effects of trade or tariffs can change people’s views on trade. Rodrik and Di Tella (2020) ask respondents to imagine different types of shocks that cause job loss and find that trade-related shocks, especially when in the form of outsourcing to a developing country, generate more demand for protectionism. This sentiment played a significant role in both the US-China tariff war and Brexit, where economic nationalism and the desire to protect domestic industries and jobs from global competition were central themes driving these events. A survey by Stantcheva (2023) concludes that respondents perceive consumer gains from trade as vague and diffuse. Grossman and Helpman (2021) find that people’s views on trade draw from the status of groups they identify with.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a basic model of behavioral agents. Section 3 introduces a classical trade model with behavioral agents and explores gains from trade. Section 4 studies the government’s optimal interventions, such as optimal tariffs and optimal nudges. Section 5 discusses implications of the findings in this paper. Section 6 concludes.

2 A Basic Model of Behavioral Agents

This section presents a detailed model outlining various behavioral biases and explores how these biases alter the standard outcomes in price theory.

2.1 Model Setup

The initial part of this analysis delineates between a rational agent (he/him/his) and a behavioral agent (she/her/hers) within an economy.¹ The economy consists of n tradeable goods, indexed by $1, \dots, n$, with the $n \times 1$ price vector $\mathbf{p} \equiv \{p_i\}$.

For the rational agent, preferences are defined by $u(\mathbf{x})$, where $\mathbf{x} \equiv \{x_i\}$ is the $n \times 1$ vector of consumptions x_i . Their demand functions, denoted by the vector $\mathbf{x}^r(\mathbf{p}, w)$, are a function of these preferences and their budget w , adhering to the budget constraint $\mathbf{p} \cdot \mathbf{x}^r(\mathbf{p}, w) = w$. The optimality conditions stipulate the existence of a positive $\lambda > 0$ such that $u_c(\mathbf{x}) = \lambda \mathbf{p}$. The agent’s utility is measured by the indirect utility function $v(\mathbf{p}, w) = u(\mathbf{x}^r(\mathbf{p}, w))$.

In contrast, the behavioral agent suffers from behavioral biases. The central distinction lies in the behavioral agent’s demand functions $\mathbf{x}^b(\mathbf{p}, w)$, which, while still satisfying the budget constraint $\mathbf{p} \cdot \mathbf{x}^b(\mathbf{p}, w) = w$, do not necessarily maximize her true utility as defined by $u(\mathbf{x})$. In this framework, I consider two distinct types of behavioral biases: utility misperception and price misperception. In the first case, the behavioral agent maximizes the “perceived” utility function $u^b(\mathbf{x})$, instead of the true utility function $u(\mathbf{x})$. In the second case, the behavioral agent fails to keep track of the true prices \mathbf{p} and misperceives the prices as $\boldsymbol{\pi}(\mathbf{p}, w)$, a function of the true price \mathbf{p} and her income w . That is, the behavioral agent maximizes a misperceived utility function $u^b(\mathbf{x})$ based on misperceived prices $\boldsymbol{\pi}(\mathbf{p}, w)$, but the actual utility received is the “true” utility $u(\mathbf{x})$.

¹My baby girl deserves to be the protagonist in my model, and I am happy to take the supporting role.

The behavioral agent's demand functions $x^b(\mathbf{p}, \boldsymbol{\pi}(\mathbf{p}, w), w)$ align with the condition $u_c^b(x^b) = \lambda^b \boldsymbol{\pi}$, where $\lambda^b > 0$ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint $\mathbf{p} \cdot x^b(\mathbf{p}, \boldsymbol{\pi}(\mathbf{p}, w), w) = w$. This condition implies that the behavioral agent maximizes her behavioral utility functions by equating the perceived marginal rates of substitution with relative perceived prices. While the behavioral agent misperceives prices and may fail to deplete all budget, the Lagrange multiplier λ^b adjusts to guarantee that her budget constraint is satisfied. The behavioral agent's perceived utility can be measured by the perceived indirect utility function $v^b(\mathbf{p}, \boldsymbol{\pi}(\mathbf{p}, w), w) = u^b(x^b(\mathbf{p}, \boldsymbol{\pi}(\mathbf{p}, w), w))$.

The disparity between true and perceived prices, alongside perceived utility, affects both choices and welfare, while the true utility influences only welfare.

The behavioral wedge $\boldsymbol{\theta} \equiv \{\theta_i\}$ is defined as

$$\boldsymbol{\theta} = \mathbf{p} - \frac{\mathbf{u}_x(x^b)}{v_w} \quad (1)$$

with dimension $n \times 1$. It is the difference between the price and true marginal utility vectors (expressed in a money metric, as captured by v_w). The wedge $\boldsymbol{\theta}$ equals zero in the rational-agent model and encodes the welfare effects of a marginal reduction in the consumption of different goods, expressed in a money metric.

In the model of the behavioral agent with utility misperception and price misperception, the behavioral wedge in equation (1) is explicitly derived as

$$\boldsymbol{\theta} = \underbrace{\frac{u_x^b(x^b(\mathbf{p}, \boldsymbol{\pi}(\mathbf{p}, w), w))}{v_w^b(\mathbf{p}, \boldsymbol{\pi}(\mathbf{p}, w), w)} - \frac{u_x(x^b(\mathbf{p}, \boldsymbol{\pi}(\mathbf{p}, w), w))}{v_w(\mathbf{p}, w)}}_{\text{utility misperception}} + \underbrace{\mathbf{p} - \frac{\boldsymbol{\pi}(\mathbf{p}, w)}{\boldsymbol{\pi}(\mathbf{p}, w) \cdot \mathbf{x}_w(\mathbf{p}, w)}}_{\text{price misperception}}. \quad (2)$$

The behavioral wedge $\boldsymbol{\theta}$ quantifies the deviation due to behavioral biases, combining effects of utility and price misperceptions into a single measure, highlighting overconsumption or underconsumption relative to the rational choice. The first term is the difference between true and perceived marginal utilities. The second term is the difference between true prices and perceived prices.

The behavioral wedge is positive when the good is overconsumed at the margin. Regarding the misperception of preferences, overconsumption implies a scenario where the perceived marginal utility is larger than the true marginal utility. In the context of price misperception, overconsumption occurs when the behavioral agent underestimates the true prices of goods, perceiving them to be lower than their true prices.

2.2 The Behavioral Version of Roy's Identity

This section revisits Roy's identity to assess the welfare impacts of price changes in the context of behavioral biases.

Traditional Roy's identity concludes that the welfare effect of a price change Δp_j is equal to an

income loss of $x_j \Delta p_j$, with welfare changes directly tied to the marginal value of income, represented by the budget constraint's Lagrange multiplier. The rational agents experience no welfare change from substitution effects, as dictated by the envelope theorem, leading to a welfare change due to a change in price p_j as

$$\frac{\partial v(\mathbf{p}, w)}{\partial p_j} = -x_j v_w.$$

The behavioral agent, however, perceives and responds to price changes differently due to behavioral biases, misperceiving price changes as $\Delta \pi$ and responding based on wrong marginal rates of substitution. This misperception and sub-optimal response introduce a substitution effect on welfare, as the envelope theorem cannot be applied. That is, for the behavioral agent, the welfare effect of a change in price p_j incorporates both substitution and income effects.

For the behavioral agent, the welfare change due to a change in price p_j is

$$\frac{\partial v(\mathbf{p}, w)}{\partial p_j} = (-x_j - \theta \cdot \mathbf{S}_j^b) v_w. \quad (3)$$

where \mathbf{S}_j^b is the j -th column of the behavioral income-compensated Slutsky matrix \mathbf{S}^b , corresponding to the consumption response to a compensated change in the price p_j defined as

$$\mathbf{S}_j^b = x_{p_j}(\mathbf{p}, w) + x_j(\mathbf{p}, w) x_w(\mathbf{p}, w).$$

The term $\theta \cdot \mathbf{S}_j^b v_w$ in equation (3) is a new term that arises with the behavioral agent. It captures how behavioral wedges influence welfare change from a price change. The first term is a standard income effect: a change in the price of good j appears as if income changes by $-x_j$, which is converted to welfare change by the money metric v_w as $-x_j v_w$. The second term is the substitution effect: a change in the price of good j changes consumption according to \mathbf{S}_j^b and causes welfare losses by $\theta \cdot \mathbf{S}_j^b v_w$.

2.3 Examples of Behavioral Biases

This section gives examples of various types of behavioral biases that can be considered in the framework in Section 2.1.

2.3.1 Utility Misperceptions

Consumption habit Behavioral agents may have a habitual consumption pattern, deviating from which incurs a utility cost. If the true utility function is $u(\mathbf{x})$, the perceived utility for a behavioral agent with consumption habits becomes $u(\mathbf{x}) - c(\mathbf{x} - \mathbf{x}^{\text{habit}})$, where $c(\mathbf{x} - \mathbf{x}^{\text{habit}})$ represents the cost of deviating from habitual consumption $\mathbf{x}^{\text{habit}} \equiv \{x_i^{\text{habit}}\}$.

Home bias Behavioral agents may display a preference for domestic goods, perceiving enhanced utility from domestic products over foreign ones. If the true utility function is $u(x_{\text{home}}, x_{\text{foreign}})$,

where x_{home} and x_{foreign} denote vectors of domestic and foreign goods consumption, respectively, the perceived utility for a behavioral agent with home habits becomes $u(\alpha x_{\text{home}}, x_{\text{foreign}})$, where $\alpha > 1$ represents the degree of home bias.

Externality Behavioral agents may neglect the environmental costs of their consumption, leading to a distorted perception of their utility. If the true utility function is $u(x_1, x_2) - e(x_1)$, where $e(x_1)$ is the environmental cost of consuming x_1 , a behavioral agent may perceive the utility as $u(x_1, x_2)$, omitting the environmental cost.

Internality/overconsumption Behavioral agents may overlook the health costs associated with certain goods, such as tobacco or alcohol. If the true utility function is $u(x_1, x_2) - h(x_1)$, where $h(x_1)$ is the health cost of consuming x_1 , a behavioral agent may perceive the utility as $u(x_1, x_2)$, ignoring these health costs.

Addiction Behavioral agents may feel compelled to consume a minimum quantity of a specific good, regardless of its utility impact. If the true utility function is $u(x_1, x_2)$, a behavioral agent with addiction perceives the utility as if it comes with the constraint $x_1 \geq \bar{x}_1$, where \bar{x}_1 is the minimum required consumption of the addictive good.

Myopia Behavioral agents may be myopic, undervaluing long-term costs in favor of immediate utility. If the true utility function is $u(x_1, x_2) - \beta c(x_1)$, where $c(x_1)$ represents the future cost of consuming x_1 and β is the true discount rate, a behavioral agent may perceive the utility as $u(x_1, x_2) - \delta \beta c(x_1)$, where $\delta < 1$ represents the degree of myopia.

2.3.2 Price Misperceptions

Inattention to true price/Reliance on defaults Behavioral agents may be limited by cognitive resources and rely on default or average prices instead of actively engaging with real-time price data. This behavioral tendency can be attributed to factors such as mental fatigue or limited memory capacity. As a result, a behavioral agent may make decisions under the assumption that prices align with their default or average levels despite potential deviations in the actual market.

For example, a behavioral agent may perceive price p_1 as $\pi_1 = \mathbb{E}(p_1)$.

Bounded memory This cognitive limitation impedes behavioral agents from precisely tracking fluctuating prices. Wilson (2014) models bounded memory as behavioral agents using a finite-state automation to summarize price information. That is, behavioral agents may categorize price information into basic descriptors such as “low” or “high,” and decision-making is then based on these simplified classifications.

For example, a behavioral agent may perceive price p_1 as $\pi_{1,\text{low}} = \mathbb{E}(p_1 | p_1 < \bar{p})$.

Inattention to true price changes Behavioral agents may not fully perceive the extent of price reductions, underestimating the actual change due to partial attention.

For example, a behavioral agent may perceive price p_1 as $\pi_1 = \bar{p}_1 + (1 - \delta)(p_1 - \bar{p}_1)$, where \bar{p}_1 is the initial price and $\delta \in [0, 1]$ represents the degree of inattention to price changes.

Inattention to taxes When tariffs affect the prices of goods, behavioral agents may not fully recognize the price increase, perceiving a lower impact due to limited attention to the tax component (Chetty et al., 2009).

If a tariff τ raises the price of from \bar{p}_1 to $\bar{p}_1 + \tau$, a behavioral agent may perceive the new price as $\pi_1 = \bar{p}_1 + (1 - \delta)\tau$, where $\delta \in [0, 1]$ represents the degree of inattention to taxes.

Left-digit bias This behavioral bias illustrates a psychological tendency where behavioral agents disproportionately focus on the leftmost digits of a price, leading to an inaccurate perception of the overall price.

If a price is quoted as $p_1 = n + r$, where $n \in \mathbb{N}$ is the integer part and $r \in [0, 1)$ is the fractional part, a behavioral agent may perceive this price as $\pi_1 = n + \delta r$, where $\delta \in (0, 1)$ represents the degree of left-digit bias.

3 A Classical Trade Model

This section describes a classical trade model and then analyzes how behavioral biases affect gains from trade and shape the pattern of trade.

3.1 Setup

This section explores a classical international trade model involving a country, called “Home,” transitioning from autarky to global trade.

The economy consists of n goods with the $n \times 1$ price vector \mathbf{p} , and a single production factor, labor. Consumption and output vectors are denoted as $\mathbf{x} \equiv \{x_i\}$ and $\mathbf{y} \equiv \{y_i\}$, respectively, where x_i and y_i are consumption and output of good i . With a fixed labor supply L , the production functions adhere to standard economic assumptions: twice differentiability, diminishing marginal returns, and constant returns to scale. Assume that the production possibility frontier is represented by $F(\mathbf{y}; L) = 0$. It is assumed that equilibrium always exists and is unique.

Home’s income, represented by $R(\mathbf{p}) = \mathbf{p} \cdot \mathbf{y}(\mathbf{p})$ is derived from the production under a given price vector \mathbf{p} . Home’s welfare, $v(\mathbf{p}) \equiv v(\mathbf{p}, R(\mathbf{p}))$, is evaluated under price vector \mathbf{p} and income $R(\mathbf{p})$.

The autarky and world price vectors are denoted by \mathbf{p}^A and \mathbf{p}^W . In autarky, the market clearing conditions determine the autarky prices \mathbf{p}^A such that that

$$\mathbf{p}^A \cdot (\mathbf{y}(\mathbf{p}^A) - \mathbf{x}(\mathbf{p}^A)) \equiv 0. \quad (4)$$




Figure 1: Autarkic equilibria under different scenarios

The condition in equation (4) allows the equilibrium to have excess supply if the price of that good is zero.

Gains from trade are defined as the welfare difference between these two prices:

$$G(\mathbf{p}_1, \mathbf{p}_2) = v(\mathbf{p}_2) - v(\mathbf{p}_1).$$

3.2 Pattern of Trade

This section discusses the implications of behavioral biases on trade patterns.

Because the rational agent and behavioral agent choose different consumption bundles, the equilibrium autarky prices are different. The autarky prices for rational agents and behavioral agents, denoted by $\mathbf{p}^{A,r}$ and $\mathbf{p}^{A,b}$, satisfy the conditions

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{p}^{A,r} \cdot [\mathbf{y}(\mathbf{p}^{A,r}) - \mathbf{x}^r(\mathbf{p}^{A,r})] &\equiv 0 \\ \mathbf{p}^{A,b} \cdot [\mathbf{y}(\mathbf{p}^{A,b}) - \mathbf{x}^b(\mathbf{p}^{A,b}, \pi(\mathbf{p}^{A,b}, R(\mathbf{p}^{A,b})), R(\mathbf{p}^{A,b}))] &\equiv 0. \end{aligned}$$

These conditions highlight how behavioral biases can lead to distinct autarky equilibria, potentially leading to different autarky prices $\mathbf{p}^{A,r}$ and $\mathbf{p}^{A,b}$ and different outputs, $\mathbf{y}(\mathbf{p}^{A,r})$ and $\mathbf{y}(\mathbf{p}^{A,b})$.

Figure 1 illustrates the possibilities of different patterns of trade. Consider a two-good economy to visualize the impact of these biases on trade patterns. Home's production technology is described by the production possibility frontier (PPF).

The rational agent (Figure 1a) Home's welfare is maximized, given its production constraint, by choosing the production point and consumption point where the indifference curve IC^r is tangent to the PPF. The autarky price is $(p_1/p_2)^{A,r}$.

The behavioral agent with utility misperception (Figure 1b) The behavioral agent misperceives her preferences and aims to maximize her utility using the behavioral indifference curve IC^b , which results in the utility level according to the true indifference curve IC^r . This preference bias for good 1 adjusts the autarky price to $(p_1/p_2)^{A,b}$, moving production away from good 2 towards good 1. As a result, the welfare of the behavioral agent in figure 1b is smaller than the welfare of the rational agent in figure 1.

The behavioral agent with price misperception (Figure 1c) The behavioral agent misperceives the price ratio as $(\pi_1/\pi_2)^A$, instead of the true price ratio $(p_1/p_2)^{A,b}$. This misperception leads her to underconsume good 1 and overconsume good 2, based on her perceived prices. Despite production aligning with true prices, consumption based on misperceived prices results in a suboptimal allocation in autarky, where the behavioral agent's true utility, indicated by the true indifference curve IC^r , is smaller than the utility level the rational agent achieves.

In short, these three examples illustrate how behavioral biases in utility and price misperception can distort trade patterns and welfare outcomes in autarky.

3.3 Gains from trade

This section evaluates the welfare gains from trade under two scenarios: (i) a change in world prices and (ii) a deviation from the autarky.

3.3.1 A Change in World Prices

This subsection compares welfare gains from trade of rational and behavioral agents when world prices change due to trade liberalization.

For the rational agent, a change in price p_j^W leads to welfare gains from trade approximated by

$$\frac{\partial v(\mathbf{p}^W, w)}{\partial p_j^W} = v_w (y_j - x_j).$$

The derivation is directly from Roy's identity and Hotelling's lemma. This equation states that the welfare gain from a change in price p_j^W depends on $(y_j - x_j) \Delta p_j^W$, where the term $(y_j - x_j)$ is the net export of good j and Δp_j^W is the magnitude of the price change. Home experiences welfare gains if (i) Home is an exporter of good j and price p_j increases, or (ii) Home is an importer of good j and price p_j^W decreases. In contrast, Home receives welfare losses if (i) Home is an exporter of good j and price p_j decreases, or (ii) Home is an importer of good j and price p_j^W increases. The size of the welfare change in terms of money depends on the magnitudes of net export/import and the price change. This welfare change is converted from money value to utility units using a money metric denoted by v_w .

In general, the welfare gains that arise from a change in world prices $D\mathbf{p}^W \equiv \{dp_i^W\}$ can be




Figure 2: A change in market equilibrium under the rational agent when the price ratio increases from (p_1/p_2) to $(p_1/p_2)'$.

calculated by

$$dv(\mathbf{p}^W, w) = v_w(\mathbf{y} - \mathbf{x}) \cdot D\mathbf{p}^W \quad (5)$$

Figure 2 illustrates gains from trade under the rational agent. When the price ratio increases from (p_1/p_2) to $(p_1/p_2)'$, production moves along the PPF from point y to point y' , and consumption moves from point x^r on the black budget line to point $x^{r'}$ on the (new) red budget line. Welfare gains from the price change are captured by the movement from the indifference curve IC to the indifference curve IC' .

For the behavioral agent, the welfare change from a change in price p_j^W is

$$\frac{\partial v(\mathbf{p}^W, w)}{\partial p_j^W} = v_w(\mathbf{y}_j - \mathbf{x}_j - \boldsymbol{\theta}^T \mathbf{S}_j^b) = (\mathbf{y}_j - \mathbf{x}_j) v_w + (-\boldsymbol{\theta}^T \mathbf{S}_j^b) v_w.$$

This equation is directly from the behavioral version of Roy's identity in equation (3) and Hotelling's lemma. The welfare gains from trade under the behavioral agent comprise not only the traditional gains but also the distortions from behavioral biases. This latter component depends on two factors: (i) the extent to which price changes affect consumption, as quantified by the Slutsky matrix \mathbf{S}_j^b , and (ii) the degree of inefficiency, measured by the behavioral wedge $\boldsymbol{\theta}$. Consequently, behavioral agents might realize either amplified or diminished welfare gains from trade, contingent on the nature and extent of their behavioral biases.

The welfare gains from trade that arise from a change in world prices $D\mathbf{p}^W \equiv \{dp_i^W\}$ is summarized by Proposition 1.




Figure 3: A change in market equilibrium when the price ratio increases from (p_1/p_2) to $(p_1/p_2)'$ under the behavioral agent.

Proposition 1. *Welfare gains that arise from a change in world prices Dp^W can be calculated by*

$$dv(p^W, w) = \underbrace{v_w(y - x) \cdot Dp^W}_{\text{the traditional gains from trade}} + \underbrace{v_w(-\theta^T S^b) \cdot Dp^W}_{\text{distortions from behavioral biases}}. \quad (6)$$

Figure 3 provides three examples of how behavioral biases impact welfare gains from trade. These scenarios are based on the equilibrium in Figure 2. Because behavioral bias does not affect production under the world prices, in all three examples in Figure 3, the production points y and y' , the budget lines, and the consumption points x^r and $x^{r'}$ are consistent with the equilibrium under the rational agent in Figure 2. For visual clarity, Figure 3 concentrates exclusively on consumption decisions.

Figure 3a portrays a scenario in which a behavioral agent with utility misperception may get amplified gains from trade, Figure 3b illustrates a situation where utility misperception could lead to diminished trade gains, and Figure 3c shows a case that a behavioral agent with price misperception may get diminished gains.

Utility misperception and amplified gains from trade (Figure 3a) The behavioral agent misperceives her preferences and maximizes her utility based on her misperceived utility function, leading her to choose the consumption point x^b where her perceived indifference curve IC^b is tangent to her budget line. However, her true utility level aligns with the indifference curve IC^r . After the price change, she chooses her new consumption point $x^{b'}$ where her perceived indifference curve $IC^{b'}$ is tangent to the new budget line and yields her true utility level based on the indifference curve $IC^{r'}$. In this case, the magnitude of the distortions from behavioral bias diminishes after the price change, as evidenced by $\|x^{r'} - x^{b'}\| < \|x^r - x^b\|$. Consequently, the behavioral agent's welfare gains from trade surpass those of the rational agent.

For instance, consider the gains from trade when imported avocados become cheaper. The rational agent correctly controls their consumption in response to health considerations and appropriately increases his avocado consumption, reaping welfare gains from trade. The behavioral agent, initially prone to underconsuming healthy foods, might benefit more significantly from the price change by increasing their healthy food consumption, thus reducing the distortions stemming from behavioral bias.

Utility misperception and reduced gains from trade (Figure 3b) Contrary to scenario 3a, The behavioral agent misperceives her preferences, but her new consumption point $x^{b'}$ on the perceived indifference curve $IC^{b'}$ amplifies the behavioral bias distortions after the price change, as suggested by $\|x^{r'} - x^{b'}\| > \|x^r - x^b\|$. This results in the behavioral agent's welfare gains from trade being smaller than those of the rational agent.

To contextualize, in the avocado example, while the rational agent adapts their consumption towards cheaper avocados, the behavioral agent who has habitual consumption fails to adjust optimally, potentially incurring smaller gains or even welfare losses from trade due to their consumption habits.

Price misperception and distorted gains from trade (Figure 3c) This example focuses on a behavioral agent with price misperception; she does not recognize the true price ratio $(p_1/p_2)'$ and uses the perceived price ratio (π_1/π_2) . Her consumption choice aligns with the point on the budget line where her true marginal rate of substitution equals the perceived price ratio (π_1/π_2) , leading to the consumption point on the indifference curve IC^r . Despite the price change, her inattentiveness to the updated price ratio results in her choosing the new consumption point $x^{b'}$ on the indifference curve $IC^{r'}$, where her marginal rate of substitution remains aligned with the perceived price ratio (π_1/π_2) .

Revisiting the avocado example, if the behavioral agent fails to account for the new, lower avocado prices, her consumption remains suboptimal. Her actions, governed by outdated price perceptions, result in welfare gains that are less than what could be achieved with accurate price information.

3.3.2 A Deviation from the Autarky

This subsection contrasts welfare gains from trade of rational and behavioral agents when the initial prices are the autarky prices.

For the rational agent, evaluating welfare change from a change in world prices at the autarky prices yields

$$dv(\mathbf{p}^W, w) \Big|_{\mathbf{p}^W = \mathbf{p}^A} = 0. \quad (7)$$

This result is directly from equation (5) and the autarky market equilibrium condition that the

domestic production of good i is equal to the consumption of good i . The fact that the derivative is zero implies that Home's welfare is minimized at the autarky prices and any deviation from these prices should theoretically result in welfare gains from trade.

In contrast to the rational agent, the behavioral agent's welfare changes from trade are influenced by behavioral biases, as shown in Proposition 2.

Proposition 2. *For the behavioral agent, welfare gains from trade evaluated at the autarky prices are calculated by*

$$dv(\mathbf{p}^W, w) \Big|_{\mathbf{p}^W = \mathbf{p}^A} = -v_w \boldsymbol{\theta}^T \mathbf{S}^b \cdot D\mathbf{p}^W.$$

Proposition 2 states that the derivative is not necessarily zero, which means that behavioral agents' welfare does not necessarily reach its global minimum value at the autarky prices due to the presence of behavioral biases.

Given that the welfare function is convex with respect to prices, the fact that welfare is not minimized at the autarky prices suggests the existence of a set of world prices where a country's welfare could be less than that achieved under autarky conditions. In essence, a country may experience trade-induced welfare losses if world prices move into an unfavorable range.

Proposition 3. *If $v_w \boldsymbol{\theta}^T \mathbf{S}^b \cdot D\mathbf{p}^W \neq 0$, there is a non-empty set of world price vectors such that a country that has behavioral agents experiences welfare losses from trade when the world prices fall into that set.*

4 Government's Optimal Interventions

4.1 Model Setup

Consider a world economy with 2 countries, called Home (without *) and Foreign (with *). There are 2 goods, denoted by $i = 1, 2$, which are produced under perfect competition. Home's consumption and production of good i are denoted by x_i and y_i , respectively. Good 2 is the numeraire good, and its price is normalized to one. Let p^w and p be the relative price of good 1 in the world and Home, respectively.

Home's income, represented by $R = py_1(p) + y_2(p)$ is derived from the production given the domestic prices. Suppose that Home is a natural importer of good 1 and a natural exporter of good 2. The balance of trade requires that $p^w(x_1 - y_1) = y_2 - x_2$. The market clearing condition is that $x_1 - y_1 = y_1^* - x_1^*$.

Tariffs τ and τ^* create a wedge between the domestic price and world price as $p = (1 + \tau)p^w$ and $p^* = p^w / (1 + \tau^*)$. Following the standard assumptions, the welfare function is assumed to be twice differentiable in τ and a global maximum exists and is unique. Home's government maximizes the welfare of its representative agent:

$$\max_{\tau} = v(p, R + (p - p^w)(x_1 - y_1)). \quad (8)$$

4.2 Optimal Tariffs

When Home's government chooses tariff τ to maximize the indirect welfare function in equation (8), the tariff is set according to the following first-order condition

$$\frac{\partial v(\mathbf{p}, w)}{\partial p} \frac{dp}{d\tau} + v_w \left[\frac{dR}{dp} \frac{dp}{d\tau} + \left(\frac{dp}{d\tau} - \frac{dp^w}{d\tau} \right) (x_1 - y_1) + \tau p^w \frac{d(x_1 - y_1)}{d\tau} \right] = 0. \quad (9)$$

The term $\frac{\partial v(\mathbf{p}, w)}{\partial p}$ can be simplified using Roy's identity, while $\frac{dR}{dp} = y_1$ is directly from Hotelling's lemma. For the rational agent, the optimal tariff in equation (9) is reduced to

$$\underbrace{\tau p^w \frac{dm_1}{d\tau}}_{\text{distortions}} + \underbrace{\left(-m_1 \frac{dp^w}{d\tau} \right)}_{\text{terms-of-trade manipulation}} = 0, \quad (10)$$

where m_1 denotes Home's net import of good 1.

The first term represents the domestic distortion caused by the impact of tariffs on production and consumption levels. The second term represents the terms-of-trade effect of using tariffs to lower the world prices of imports. Equation (10) states that at the optimal tariff levels, the marginal benefit of tariffs via the terms-of-trade effect should be equal to its marginal cost in terms of domestic distortions.

For the rational agent, the optimal tariff τ in equation 10 is expressed explicitly as

$$\tau = \frac{1}{\varepsilon_1^*},$$

where ε_1^* is the elasticity of foreign export supply.

This expression aligns with Johnson's (1953) optimal tariffs. The idea is that the efficacy of tariffs depends on the foreign elasticity of export supply. Countries with significant market power (where foreign supply elasticity is finite and notably less than infinity) can receive net welfare gains from positive tariffs. In contrast, small economies, characterized by infinite foreign supply elasticity, find that their optimal tariffs are zero.

For the behavioral agent, the optimal tariff balances not only between domestic distortions and the terms-of-trade effect but also accounts for how tariffs influence consumption behaviors distorted by behavioral biases.

Substituting the behavioral version of Roy's identity in equation (3) into the condition for the optimal tariff in equation (9) lead to the equation in Proposition 4.

Proposition 4. *In the case of the behavioral agent, Home's optimal tariff τ satisfies*

$$\underbrace{\left(-\theta \cdot \mathbf{s}_1^b \right) \frac{dp}{d\tau}}_{\text{behavioral biases}} + \underbrace{\tau p^w \frac{dm_1}{d\tau}}_{\text{distortions}} + \underbrace{\left(-m_1 \frac{dp^w}{d\tau} \right)}_{\text{terms-of-trade manipulation}} = 0. \quad (11)$$

This condition highlights that, in addition to the tariff revenue and the terms-of-trade manipulation, optimal tariffs must also mitigate or exploit the effects of behavioral biases on consumption patterns.

Analyzing the impact of an increase in tariff τ on a particular good i involves understanding two key factors: (i) the cross-price elasticity, based on the Slutsky matrix S_1^b and (ii) whether good i is overconsumed, underconsumed, or consumed at an optimal level, based on the behavioral wedge θ .

An increase in tariff τ magnifies welfare loss from behavioral biases if (i) the price increase leads to higher consumption of good i when it is already overconsumed ($\theta_i > 0$), or (ii) the price increase reduces the consumption of good i , when it is already underconsumed ($\theta_i < 0$). Conversely, an increase in tariff τ can reduce the welfare loss from behavioral biases if (i) the price increase leads to higher consumption of good i when it is already underconsumed ($\theta_i < 0$), or (ii) the price increase lowers consumption of good i , when it is already overconsumed ($\theta_i > 0$).

The optimal tariffs in equation (11) can be solved explicitly as in Proposition 5.

Proposition 5. *In the case of the behavioral agent, Home's optimal tariff τ is*

$$\tau = \frac{1}{\varepsilon_1^*} + \frac{\theta^b \cdot S_1^b}{p^w (dm/dp)}$$

In contrast to the rational agent's optimal tariffs, which are primarily a function of foreign elasticity of export supply, the behavioral agent's optimal tariffs incorporate an additional term that corrects welfare losses attributable to behavioral biases.

This additional term consists of three factors: (i) the effect on consumption, (ii) the magnitude of the behavioral biases, and (iii) the direct welfare cost of tariffs. First, the impact of tariffs on consumption is captured by the Slutsky matrix. In scenarios where consumers are inattentive to tariffs, these tariffs cannot effectively address behavioral biases. Consequently, under such circumstances, tariffs should not be employed as a means for correcting behavioral biases.

Second, the behavioral wedge quantifies the extent of welfare losses due to behavioral biases. If the magnitude of the behavioral wedge is large, optimal tariffs may aim to correct the biases. Under the rational agent, the behavioral wedge is zero, and the optimal tariffs are reduced to a function of the foreign elasticity of export supply.

Third, the denominator in this term captures the direct welfare cost of tariffs. It is represented by the change in the value of net imports, evaluated at the world price. The intuition is that tariffs should aim to mitigate these welfare losses, particularly when they are substantial in comparison to the welfare costs incurred by the distortive effects of the tariff intervention.

In general, we can interpret this result as that (i) the policymakers use the optimal tariffs to correct the behavioral bias at the expense of the usual welfare, or (ii) the policymakers need to be aware of another welfare consequence via the behavioral biases when it aims to use tariffs to manipulate the terms of trade.

Proposition 6. *The optimal tariff of a small open economy characterized by a behavioral representative consumer is*

$$\tau = \frac{\theta^b \cdot S_1^b}{p^w (dm/dp)}.$$

Proposition 6 establishes a novel insight that in the presence of behavioral biases, trade policy—specifically tariffs—serves as a second-best policy aiming at welfare losses attributable to behavioral biases. Traditional economic theories have offered various explanations for the use of trade policies by small open economies, including the protection-for-sale motive by Grossman and Helpman (1994) and the labor-market motive as discussed by Costinot (2009) and Suwanprasert (2017, 2018, 2020).

4.3 Optimal Nudges

In this section, I focus on nudges, which was introduced by Thaler and Sunstein (2008). Nudges come in many forms, such as reducing food waste in hotels through plate size adjustments (Kallbekken & Sælen, 2013), increasing loan demand with attractive advertisements (Bertrand et al., 2010), and raising organ donation rates by making it a default option (Johnson and Goldstein, 2003).

To introduce nudges into the model in a general way, I assume that nudges are different from tariffs in that tariffs influence both the choice set and consumption decisions, but nudges subtly change consumption choices without altering the choice set. This distinction is important for understanding how governments can employ nudges alongside tariffs to optimize their welfare.

Nudges are modeled as a continuous policy variable $\eta \in [0, 1]$ that potentially affects consumption decision vector $x(\eta)$. While nudge policies often manifest in discrete forms—such as images in advertisements or default settings—their essence can be modeled on a continuum, reflecting variations in intensity.

Following the standard assumptions, the welfare function is assumed to be twice differentiable with respect to both τ and η , and a global maximum exists and is unique.

Home’s government aims to maximize the utility of its representative agent by selecting tariff τ and nudge η :

$$\max_{\tau, \eta} = v(p, R + (p - p^w)(x_1(\eta) - y_1)) - c(\eta),$$

where $c(\eta)$ represents the cost associated with implementing the nudge policy η , subject to $c(0) = c'(0) = 0$, $c'(\eta) > 0$, and $c''(\eta) > 0$.

The optimal tariffs and nudges are characterized in Proposition 7.

Proposition 7. *At an interior optimum, the optimal nudge and tariff of an economy characterized by a*

behavioral representative consumer satisfy

$$\underbrace{-\left(\theta_1 \frac{\partial x_1}{\partial \eta} + \theta_2 \frac{\partial x_2}{\partial \eta}\right)}_{\text{behavioral biases}} + \underbrace{\tau p^w \frac{\partial m_1}{\partial \eta}}_{\text{distortions}} + \underbrace{\left(-m_1 \frac{dp^w}{d\eta}\right)}_{\text{terms-of-trade manipulation}} = c'(\eta), \quad (12)$$

and

$$\underbrace{-\left(\theta_1 \frac{\partial x_1}{\partial p} + \theta_2 \frac{\partial x_2}{\partial p}\right) \frac{dp}{d\tau}}_{\text{behavioral biases}} + \underbrace{\tau p^w \frac{dm_1}{d\tau}}_{\text{distortions}} + \underbrace{\left(-m_1 \frac{dp^w}{d\tau}\right)}_{\text{terms-of-trade manipulation}} = 0.$$

Equation (12) states that the optimal nudge policy balances its impact on welfare through three main mechanisms. The first mechanism is how the nudge addresses behavioral biases. Nudges can increase consumption ($\partial x_i / \partial \eta > 0$) of underconsumed goods ($\theta_i < 0$) or decrease consumption ($\partial x_i / \partial \eta < 0$) of overconsumed goods ($\theta_i > 0$).

The second mechanism captures how the demand for imported goods is distorted and, consequently, influences tariff revenues. The third mechanism is the terms-of-trade manipulation, representing how nudges indirectly affect global demand patterns, thereby affecting world prices. The changes in world prices can benefit or hurt Home, depending on how nudge affects consumption. Proposition 7 states that the marginal benefit of nudge η is equal to the marginal cost of implementing the nudge policy.

The optimal tariff follows the same trade-off in equation (11) Proposition 4.

Proposition 8. *At an interior optimum, the optimal nudge and tariff of an economy characterized by a rational representative consumer satisfy*

$$\tau = \frac{1}{\varepsilon_1^*}$$

$$\frac{1}{\varepsilon_1^*} p^w \frac{\partial m_1}{\partial \eta} - m_1 \frac{dp^w}{d\eta} = c'(\eta).$$

Proposition 8 highlights the role of nudges in a rational agent framework, revealing that even when tariffs are optimally set as the inverse of the elasticity of foreign export supply (ε_1^*), there exists a potential for welfare enhancement through the use of nudges. Nudges emerge as a complementary policy tool, balancing between altering distortions and manipulating terms of trade.

5 Discussions

5.1 Why do people not feel the gains from trade?

The perception of gains from trade is often not uniform among individuals. This discrepancy can be attributed to a variety of factors that influence consumer preferences and choices. I will discuss how several behavioral biases may shape how people perceive gains from trade as smaller than they truly receive.

Utility misperception First, consider the role of consumption habits. Take, for instance, a consumer who has a longstanding preference for a particular coffee brand. Even when international trade introduces a superior coffee brand that offers higher quality at a lower cost, this consumer might still opt for the usual brand. This habit leads to a failure to perceive the benefits of trade.

Second, home bias can significantly affect consumer choices. Consumers may favor domestically produced goods, such as electronics, due to perceived superior quality or a desire to support local businesses. This preference persists even when imported products offer advanced features at a more competitive price. This bias towards domestic products obscures the benefits that trade can offer in terms of variety and cost-effectiveness.

Third, environmental ignorance can play a part. If consumers are not aware of the environmental benefits of certain imported products, such as biodegradable cleaning agents, they might continue to use less eco-friendly domestic alternatives. This lack of awareness prevents them from recognizing the broader benefits of trade, particularly in terms of environmental sustainability.

Fourth, the concept of internalities and overconsumption highlights how personal preferences can overshadow potential benefits from trade. A person might prefer domestically produced fast food due to its taste or convenience, despite the availability of healthier imported organic options. This preference for immediate gratification can lead to overlooking the health benefits that trade can bring.

Lastly, myopia can hinder the perception of long-term gains from trade. A consumer might choose a cheaper domestic car over a more expensive but fuel-efficient imported car, not taking into account the long-term savings on fuel and maintenance. This short-term perspective limits the ability to perceive the economic benefits that trade can offer in the long run.

Price misperception. Misconception in prices encompasses a range of behaviors, including inattention to the true price and reliance on defaults, bounded memory, partial attention to true price changes, inattention to taxes, and the left-digit bias.

First, the phenomenon of inattention to true price and reliance on defaults is a common occurrence. For instance, consider a consumer who regularly purchases a domestic brand of rice at \$5 per bag. If an imported brand reduces its price from \$6 to \$4.50, this consumer, accustomed to the default price, may not notice the change. This lack of awareness results in the consumer missing out on an opportunity to save money despite the price advantage offered by international trade.

Second, bounded memory also plays a crucial role in consumer perception. For example, after a tariff reduction, the price of imported cheese may drop from \$10 to \$8. However, consumers with limited recall might continue to regard the cheese as 'expensive' based on their memory of past prices. This failure to recognize current savings due to tariff changes limits their ability to benefit from reduced prices.

Third, inattention to true price changes is another factor that can distort consumer perception. When tariffs on imported goods, such as cars, are removed, leading to significant price reductions, consumers might only perceive the price as marginally lower due to partial attention to the actual

price change. For example, a price drop from \$25,000 to \$22,000 may be perceived as a reduction to just \$24,000, minimizing the perceived impact of the tariff removal.

Fourth, the issue of inattention to taxes is similarly impactful. If a tariff on an imported good is eliminated, resulting in a lower price, consumers might overlook the reduced tax component of the price. This oversight prevents them from fully appreciating the decrease in price, and thus, the direct benefit of the tariff removal remains unrealized.

Lastly, the left-digit bias significantly influences consumer perception. This bias occurs when consumers focus primarily on the left-most digit of a price. For example, a price drop from \$3.99 to \$3.59 might still be perceived as around \$3 due to the focus on the initial '3'. This bias can lead to misperceptions about the extent of price reductions, potentially affecting consumer decisions.

Conclusion In summary, these biases create a complex psychological landscape that can lead consumers to fail to perceive gains from trade fully.

5.2 The 2018 China–United States trade war and Brexit.

The 2018 China–United States trade war and the United Kingdom’s decision to leave the European Union (Brexit) stand as two of the most significant geopolitical events of recent times. Both these events garnered substantial public support, a phenomenon that can be partly explained by behavioral biases, especially in terms of misperceptions in utility and prices. These biases may have influenced the public’s ability to assess the benefits of trade accurately.

One of the key behavioral biases at play involves a misperception in gains from trade. In the case of the trade war, many Americans did not fully appreciate how their standard of living benefited from access to cheaper imports from China. These imports kept the cost of living lower, a benefit that was not always visibly connected to the trade policies. Similarly, in the Brexit scenario, many UK residents failed to recognize the price benefits accruing from the seamless import of goods from the EU. This lack of recognition of the benefits of trade can be attributed to a cognitive disconnect between the everyday experiences of individuals and the larger economic processes at play.

Another aspect of behavioral bias relates to the overestimation of the costs of trade liberalization. Behavioral biases often lead to an emphasis on the more visible and immediate consequences of economic policies, such as job losses in certain sectors due to increased competition from trade. This visibility creates a skewed perception that magnifies these costs, overshadowing the more dispersed and less tangible benefits of trade. This focus on the immediate and visible impacts significantly influenced public opinion, tilting it towards protectionist policies such as the trade war and Brexit. It demonstrates a common psychological tendency to prioritize immediate, concrete costs over abstract, long-term benefits, leading to a preference for policies that might, in reality, result in overall utility losses in the long run.

6 Conclusion

This study has extended the traditional analysis of gains from trade and optimal tariffs by incorporating the complexities of human behavior. The unified framework is able to capture many types of behavioral bias, such as utility misperceptions, bounded rationality, and inattention. I explore how behavioral biases influence gains from trade. Behavioral biases have the potential to either amplify or diminish these gains, with the specific outcome contingent upon the direction of price changes and the nature of the prevailing behavioral biases.

Next, I study the optimal tariffs in the presence of behavioral biases. I show that optimal tariffs may mitigate the welfare losses attributable to behavioral biases. I then consider a joint characterization of optimal tariffs and nudges. Furthermore, this paper discusses implications in understanding why the public may not perceive the gains from trade, particularly in the backdrop of the 2018 China–United States trade war and Brexit. These discussions provide valuable insights into the intersection of international trade and public perception, influenced by underlying behavioral biases.

Overall, this research contributes to the field of international trade, particularly through the lens of behavioral economics. It opens new avenues for research and policy, encouraging a deeper examination of the role of human behavior in the field of international trade. Future studies could further explore the applications of this framework in various trade contexts. This study stands as a pioneering effort in understanding and integrating behavioral economics into the realm of international trade and trade policy formulation.

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