## The Social Cost of Thailand's

## Transportation Fuel Pricing Policy

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Wichsinee Wibulpolprasert; Bhawin Teveyanan
Thailand Development Research Institute
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## Outline of the Talk

- Background and Motivations
- Empirical Strategy
- Estimating demand elasticity
- Constructing efficient price structure
- Measuring deadweight loss from pricing policies
- Data
- Results
- Estimating demand elasticity
- Constructing efficient price structure
- Measuring deadweight loss from pricing policies
- Policy Recommendations


## Background and Motivations

## Background and Motivations

- Why does Thailand have to distort/subsidize fuel prices?
- What do we get from fuel pricing policy ?
- Limitation in reforming the petroleum price structure


## Research Questions

1. How much are the economic costs associated with these distortions?
2. What could be the alternative policies that achieve the same objectives with minimal negative impacts on economic efficiency and government's budget?

## Key takeaways

- Two objectives of the recent transportation fuel pricing policies:

1. Support the low-income and curb inflation: Diesel price cap
2. Enhance energy security: Biofuel subsidies

- Almost all the fuels have been priced below their social cost
- Diesel is the most underpriced $\rightarrow$ imposes the highest efficiency cost
- Benzene consumers are more responsive to the change in fuel prices than before
- Future policy that creates price distortions will also result in a larger deadweight loss
- Policy recommendations
- Set fuel prices to better reflect social cost (i.e. collect higher taxes)
- Recycle additional tax revenue through:
- Targeted income transfer to the poor and the logistic sector [short-run]
- Expanding infrastructure for mass transport, improving public transportation, encouraging mode shift [long-run]

Analysis Steps

- Group petroleum products
- Estimate the ownand cross-price elasticities

Estimate price
elasticity of demand


## Literature Review

- Demand Elasticities
- Koomsup et al. (2014)
- Kansuntisukmongkol and Tangkitvanich (2007)
- Vikitset (2006, 2008); Chenphuengpawn $(2012,2014)$
- Efficient pricing
- Kansuntisukmongkol and Tangkitvanich (2007)
- Koomsup et al. (2014)
- Parry et al. (2014)
- Deadweight loss calculation
- Davis (2013)
- Vikitset $(2006,2008)$; Chenphuengpawn $(2012,2014)$


# Empirical Strategy 

## Fuel Groups for Demand Estimation



## Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS)

For each bottom-level fuel within the Octane 95 segment, the budget share is specified as:

$$
s_{i t}=\alpha_{i}+\beta_{i} \ln \left(Y_{G t} / \pi_{G t}\right)+\sum_{k=1}^{J_{G}} \ln \left(p_{k t}\right)+\epsilon_{i t}
$$

- $\quad i$ denotes specity fuel in the bottom category
- $G$ denotes the top-level fuel segment
- $T$ denotes time (month-year)
- $Y_{G t}$ is the total expenditure
- $\pi_{G t}$ is the price index for the segment
- $\mathrm{p}_{k t}$ is the price of individual fuel in the bottom category

Segment-level price index takes the form of the Stone price index: $\ln \left(\pi_{G t}\right)=\sum_{k=1}^{J_{G}} s_{k t} \ln \left(p_{k t}\right)$

Budget share of each fuel within the top-level is defined similarly

## Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS)

- Calculate the uncompensated elasticity as :

$$
\epsilon_{i j}=-\delta_{i j}+\left\{\gamma_{i j}-\beta_{i} \frac{d \ln \pi}{d \ln p_{j}}\right\} / s_{i}
$$

where $\delta_{i j}=1$ for $i=j$ and $\delta_{i j}=0$ otherwise.

- Calculate the compensated elasticity as :

$$
\epsilon_{i j}^{*}=\epsilon_{i j}+s_{j}\left(1+\frac{\beta_{i}}{s_{i}}\right)
$$

Efficient retail prices = private cost + external costs of transportation fuel + vat

- External costs of transportation fuel contains 4 main social costs
- social cost of CO2
- social cost of local air pollutions (SO2, NOx)
- social cost of congestion
- social cost of accidents


## Calculating Deadweight Loss

$$
D W L=\left|\int_{Q_{i}}^{Q_{i}^{\prime}} D(q) d q-P_{i}^{\prime}\left(Q_{i}^{\prime}-Q_{i}\right)\right| \ldots-\cdots-\cdots-\cdots-\cdots \text { DWL Equation }
$$



Deadweight loss in the case of underconsumption


Quantity (Litre)
Deadweight loss in the case of overconsumption

Data

TDRI

## Data sources

- Monthly-level data on fuel prices and consumption
- The Energy Policy and Planning Office (EPPO), Ministry of Energy
- Number of Gasohol 95 E20 and E85 stations
- The Department of Energy Business (DOEB), Ministry of Energy
- External costs of transportation fuels - previous studies
- Kansuntisukmongkol and Tangkitvanich (2007)
- Koomsup et al. (2014)
- Parry et al. (2014)


## Consumption of Transportation Fuels, 2011 to 2015

Consumption (million liter), excluding Gas


- Diesel accounts for the largest portion of transportation fuel consumption, followed by Octane 91 and Octane 95
- ULG91R was discontinued in 2013
- Consumers of ULG91R may have switched to Gasohol91, ULG95R, and Gasohol95 E10


## Average Price of Diesel

Diesel Price


- Diesel price has been highly stable and almost never exceeded 30 THB/liter
- Diesel accounts for the largest share of transportation fuel consumption
- Government's priority to protect consumers from the rising cost of crude oil

Average Price of Octane 95 and Octane 91



- Gasohol prices are consistently lower than the prices of their non-gasohol counterparts
- More ethanol contents -> the cheaper the retail price
- Government's priority to encourage consumers to switch to gasohol

Status Quo Price Structure (average 2011-2015)

Price structure (average 2011-2015)


- All fuels have similar post-refinery prices
- Price structure varies according to the level of tax and oil fund fee
- ULG95R and ULG91R were subject to a lot of tax and oil fund fee
- Ethanol with more gasoline contents were subject to minimal tax and fees
- Diesel was also subject to minimal tax and fees
- Gasohol 95 E20 and E85 received subsidies from the oil fund to make them more attractive to consumers


## Results

## Price Elasticities, Octane 95

| Variable | P (Regular 95) | P (Gasohol95 E10) | P (Gasohol95 E20/E85) |
| :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Quantity Regular 95 | $-2.28^{* * *}$ | $2.88^{* * *}$ | -0.60 |
|  | $(0.44)$ | $(0.80)$ | $(0.57)$ |
| Quantity Gasohol95 E10 | $0.62^{* * *}$ | $-1.67^{* * *}$ | $1.05^{* * *}$ |
|  | $(0.13)$ | $(0.25)$ | $(0.19)$ |
| Quantity Gasohol95 E20/E85 | -0.30 | $2.43^{* * *}$ | $-2.13^{* * *}$ |
|  | $(0.34)$ | $(0.63)$ | $(0.45)$ |

- Regular 95 is a close substitute to Gasohol 95 E10, but not to the E20/E85
- Gasohol 95 E10 is a closer substitute to E20/E85 than to Regular 95
- E20/E85 is a close substitute to Gasohol 95 E10


## Price Elasticities, Top-level Gasoline

| Variable | $\mathrm{P}($ Octane 95) | $\mathrm{P}($ Octane 91$)$ | $\mathrm{P}($ Diesel $)$ |
| :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Quantity Octane 95 | $-1.08^{* *}$ | 0.68 | $0.40^{* *}$ |
|  | $(0.54)$ | $(0.50)$ | $(0.20)$ |
| Quantity Octane 91 | $0.97^{*}$ | $-1.21^{* *}$ | 0.25 |
|  | $(0.53)$ | $(0.51)$ | $(0.22)$ |
| Quantity Diesel | 0.12 | 0.05 | $-0.17^{* *}$ |
|  | $(0.17)$ | $(0.16)$ | $(0.08)$ |

- Own- and cross-price elasticities of demand for the top level gasoline group are much smaller than the bottom level (Octane 95 group)
- Larger own- and cross-price elasticities for Octane 95 and 91 groups than those of diesel
- It is much harder to substitute across the top-level gasoline, especially between Benzene and Diesel

Our Estimates Suggest that Benzene Consumers are More Responsive to Price Changes

| Study | Fuel Type | Own-price elasticity | Period |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Koomsup et al. (2014) | Octane 91 | -0.53 | $2002-2013$ |
|  | Octane 95 | -1.15 | $2002-2013$ |
|  | Diesel | -0.68 | $2002-2013$ |
| Kansuntisukmonkol (2007)* | Benzene | -1.39 | $1993-2006$ |
|  | Diesel | -1.07 | $1993-2006$ |
| Vikitset (2008) | Gasoline | -0.43 | $2002-2004$ |
|  | Diesel | -0.35 | $2002-2004$ |
| Brons et al. (2008) | Gasoline | -0.34 (short-run) | various |
|  | Gasoline | -0.84 (long-run) | various |

* refers to Kansuntisukmongkol and Tangkitvanich (2007)
- Our results are most comparable to Koomsup et al (2014)
- Diesel has lower elasticity compared to previous estimates
- Octane 91 and 95 have higher elasticities compared to previous estimates
- Distortions in the Benzene markets likely result in bigger inefficiencies than before

Efficient pricing structure 2011-2015


- Private cost accounts for 60\% - 70\% of the efficient prices
- Cost of accidents and congestion are the largest components of the social costs
- The efficient prices are more than 40 THB per liter for all gasoline types

Efficient Consumption, Top-level Gasoline Group

(A) Difference from the efficient prices

(B) Difference from the efficient quantities

- All three types of fuels were priced below the efficient level with Diesel being the most underpriced
- A switch to the efficient pricing scheme leads to an increased consumption of Octane 95 and Octane 91 and a significant reduction in Diesel consumption

Efficient Consumption, Octane 95 Group

(A) Difference from the efficient prices

Efficient quantities - status quo quantities

(в) Difference from the efficient quantities

- ULG95R was overpriced under the status quo in some periods (2013-2014)
- Gasohol 95 E10 and Gasohol 95 E20/E85 were underpriced under the status quo
- A switch to the efficient pricing leads to an increased consumption of ULG95R and Gasohol95 E10, and a decreased consumption of Gasohol 95 E20/E85


## Diesel Creates the Largest Deadweight Loss

- Highest DWL in the Diesel market

Annual deadweight loss


- In 2015, the deadweight loss was reduced by more than half compared to 2014
- Total DWL during 2011 to 2015 amounts to:
- ~ $1.2 \%$ of Thailand's GDP in 2016
- $\sim 2 \%$ percent of total expenditure on final energy consumption in 2014
- DWL of Ethanol-blended gasoline might be overstated due to their external benefit of relieving fuel scarcity (unaccounted for)
- DWL here has not taken into account additional distortions in the natural gas (LPG/NGV) market 28


## Policy Recommendations

## What does the Status Quo Price Structure Tell Us?



Subsidizing the price of biofuels is already appropriate

Alternative policies to help the poor and curb inflation

## The Middle Income Might Benefit Most from Cheap Diesel

Q 1 fuel expenditure
Q 2 fuel expenditure
Q 3 fuel expenditure


Q 4 fuel expenditure


■ diesel ■ benzene ■ gasohol 91 ■ gasohol95 ■E20 ■E85 ■NGV ■LPG

## Subsidizing Fuels is a Costly Way to Help the Poor

## Fuel (Diesel) Subsidies

- Distort the fuel markets
- Large government's spending
- Limited benefit to the poor
- Benefit leakage to the non-poor



## Income Transfer

- E.g. Conditional cash transfer (CCT)
- Use revenue from higher fuel tax
- None or minimal distortion in the fuel markets
- A well-design CCT program can:
- Cover the targeted population
- Minimize benefit leakage

Recommendations


- Income transfer program to the poor
- Improve public/mass transportation


## Conclusion

## Conclusions

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Next steps

## Future works

- Include LPG/NGV to the analysis
- Quantify the impact of implementing the efficient gasoline pricing and revenue recycling scheme on:
- Logistic cost
- Inflation
- Tax revenue
- Distributional impact
- Study on the cost of fuels shortage
- Examine how gasoline price volatility impacts consumers' price elasticity of demand for gasoline


## Back-up slides

Number of gasohol E20 and E85 stations, 2010 to 2015


Fossil Fuel Subsidies Compared to Other Expenditure


Note: ODA = official development assistance.

Sources: ADB, Statistical Database System; OECD, International Development Statistics; World Bank, Data.

## Fuel Expenditure by Income Quartile

Q 1 fuel expenditure
Q 2 fuel expenditure
Q 3 fuel expenditure


Q 4 fuel expenditure


■ diesel ■ benzene ■ gasohol 91 ■ gasohol95 ■E20 ■E85 ■NGV ■LPG

## Prices of Major Transportation Fuels are Heavily Distorted



Prices of Major Transportation Fuels are Heavily Distorted


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## Prices of Major Transportation Fuels are Heavily Distorted



Diesel, LPG, NGV Received Non-trivial
Implicit/Explicit Subsidies

Data from 2012


[^0]Q 1 fuel expenditure


Q 2 fuel expenditure


Q 4 fuel expenditure

$\square$ diesel $\quad$ benzene $\quad$ gasohol 91 ■ gasohol95 ■E20 ■E85 ■NGV ■LPG

Are our Transportation Fuels too Cheap?



[^0]:    Sources: ADB, Statistical Database System; OECD, International Development Statistics; World Bank, Data

