

The 2018 US-China Trade War and Trade Diversion: Evidence from Thai Customs Data

Nuwat Nookhwun¹, Jettawat Pattararangrong¹, Kittichai Saelee², Wisarut Suwanprasert³

¹Puey Ungphakorn Institute for Economic Research, Bank of Thailand ²Thammasat University ³Middle Tennessee State University

July 24-26, 2025

PIER Research Workshop 2025

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- ► The 2018 U.S.-China trade war significantly disrupted global trade flows, creating substantial uncertainty for exporters worldwide.
 - ⇒ Elevated tariffs covered 360 and 110 billion dollars of Chinese and U.S. exports.
 - ⇒ Continued over Biden administration, and being aggravated in Trump's second term.
- While much attention has focused on the U.S. and China (Amiti et al., 2019; Fajgelbaum et al., 2020), spillover effects on third countries are less well understood.
 - ⇒ Bystander countries may gain or lose from the trade war, depending on degrees of product substitutability and production responses (Fajgelbaum et al., 2024).
 - ⇒ Spillovers may also emanate from supply chain linkages with China or the U.S.
 - \Rightarrow Thailand emerges as an interesting study case due to high trade dependency and large trade with both the U.S. and China.





- ▶ We investigate how Thailand's exports responded to bilateral tariff shocks using detailed customs data from 2013–2023.
- Our analysis exploits cross-product variations in tariff exposure and the timing of tariff changes to identify the spill-over effects on Thailand's exports to major destinations.
- ► This paper also examines:
 - Dynamic responses of Thai exports
 - Product heterogeneity
 - Whether export reactions reflect potential transshipment or supply chain link with China



Preview of Empirical Results

- ► Significant trade diversion effects due to U.S. tariffs on Chinese products, which raised Thai exports to the U.S. and ASEAN.
- Larger effects for manufacturing goods in U.S. strategic sectors.
- ► Suggestive evidence of transshipment of Chinese goods to the U.S., rather than supply-chain integration
- ▶ Rather limited spillover effects from China retaliation, with some negative impact on exports to China in certain sectors.



Related Literature

- ► This paper mainly contributes to the literature on third-country spillovers of trade policy shocks.
 - ⇒ Global reallocation: Fajgelbaum et al (2024), Alfaro and Chor (2023)
- On supply chain links to China & potential transshipment: Freund et al (2024), lyoha et al (2024), Hayakawa (2024), Utar et al (2023)
- ▶ Impact of trade war on the U.S. and Chinese economies:
 - ⇒ The U.S.: Amiti et al (2020), Fajgelbaum et al (2020), Handley et al (2020)
 - ⇒ China: Jiao et al.(2024)



Overview of the 2018 U.S.-China Trade War

From July 6, 2018, the U.S. implemented five waves of tariff hikes against China.




Figure: U.S.-China Tariff Rates from Bown (2021)



Thai Exports by Major Destinations

Since 2018, exports to the U.S. have strongly expanded from roughly 10% to almost 20%, even as imports from China have risen significantly.




Figure: Share to Total Thai Exports




Figure: Share to Total Thai Imports



Tariff Coverage across Thai Export Sectors

- ▶ U.S. tariffs and China retaliation cover 92% and 85% of Thai exports, respectively.
- ▶ Machinery and Electrical account for around 60% of total exports to the U.S., whereas China is a key market for Agriculture and Plastic & Rubber products.

Table: Thai Exports by Sectors

	Share of	Exports	То:			
Sector	US Tariffs	China Retaliation	World	U.S.	China	ASEAN
Agriculture	91%	78%	17.6%	9.7%	33.6%	18.3%
Apparel	98%	93%	2.8%	2.8%	1.2%	3.2%
Chemicals	90%	93%	5.7%	1.6%	6.3%	9.8%
Electrical	94%	77%	22.0%	35.5%	10.4%	17.1%
Machinery	98%	94%	19.0%	24.0%	11.6%	16.0%
Materials	99%	99%	7.3%	3.3%	2.6%	10.6%
Plastics & rubbers	99%	63%	14.3%	12.2%	26.0%	12.9%
Transportation	68%	92%	14.7%	4.6%	2.9%	19.4%
Other: Metals, Minerals	95%	97%	11.4%	10.9%	8.1%	12.0%
All sectors	92%	85%	100%	100%	100%	100%



How to Construct the 2018 Trade War Tariffs

- ▶ We aggregate all quarterly trade flow to the HS6 (3,765 products).
- ► For each HS-6 product *i* and quarter *t*, we compute weighted averages of the 10-digit or 8-digit tariff rates relative to the pre-war period.

$$\Delta \tau_{i,t}^{US \to CN} = \sum_{j \in i} w_{j,1317}^{US \to CN} \Delta \tau_{j,t}^{US \to CN}$$
(1)

$$\Delta \tau_{i,t}^{CN \to US} = \sum_{j \in i} w_{j,17}^{CN \to US} \Delta \tau_{j,t}^{CN \to US}$$
(2)

- $w_{j,1317}^{US \to CN}$ the share of U.S. imports of Chinese products within the corresponding HS-6 product category ($w_{i,17}^{CN \to US}$ share of Chinese imports of U.S. products).
- $\tau_{i,t}^{US \to CN}$ from Fajgelbaum et al. (2024) available at HS-10 level
- \bullet $\tau_{i,t}^{CN \to US}$ from Bown (2021) at HS-8 level



Additional Tariffs from the 2018 U.S.-China Trade War




Figure: Additional U.S. Tariffs on Chinese Products ($\Delta \tau^{US \to CN}$)



Additional Tariffs from the 2018 U.S.-China Trade War

- ▶ U.S. tariff exposure, mostly at 25%, exceeds that of China across all sectors.
- ► Significant variations in additional tariffs within and across industries




Figure: U.S. tariffs: $\Delta \tau^{\textit{US} \rightarrow \textit{CN}}$




Figure: China tariffs: $\Delta \tau^{\textit{CN} \rightarrow \textit{US}}$



Baseline Specification

► Panel regression at the HS-6 product-by-destination-by-quarter level

$$y_{it}^{d} = \frac{\beta_{1}}{\epsilon} \left(\mathsf{Post}_{it} \times \Delta \tau_{it}^{US \to CN} \right) + \frac{\beta_{2}}{\epsilon} \left(\mathsf{Post}_{it} \times \Delta \tau_{it}^{CN \to US} \right) + \beta \cdot \mathbf{X}_{it} + \epsilon_{it}, \quad (3)$$

- y_{it}^d log of export value to destination d for product i in quarter t
- \blacksquare Post_t the dummy variable for the period that product i faces tariff hikes
- **X**_{it} includes tariff rates the U.S. and China imposed on Thai exports
- Time and product-by-quarter fixed effects
- Focus on six export destinations: U.S., China, Japan, Europe, ASEAN and ROW



Export Responses to the U.S.-China Trade War

- ► Thai exports may gain from the Trade War, as Thai goods substitute for Chinese products in the U.S. market.
- ► ASEAN exports benefit from greater regional value chain integration or a downward supply curve.

Table: The Effect of U.S.-China Trade War on Thai Exports by Destination.

	Total	USA	China	Japan	Europe	ASEAN	ROW
$Post_{it} imes \Delta au_{it}^{\mathit{US} o \mathit{CN}}$	0.750**	1.624**	0.128	0.340	-0.053	0.873**	-0.211
	(0.346)	(0.709)	(0.775)	(0.561)	(0.613)	(0.371)	(0.503)
$Post_{it} imes \Delta au_{it}^{\mathit{CN} o \mathit{US}}$	0.646*	0.526	-1.101	-0.226	0.235	0.614	0.290
	(0.365)	(0.550)	(0.730)	(0.521)	(0.599)	(0.432)	(0.507)
$ au_{it}^{US o TH}$	-0.737	-2.536**	-2.075	-3.173***	-2.715**	-1.725**	-2.184**
	(0.560)	(1.166)	(1.475)	(1.114)	(1.180)	(0.727)	(1.043)
$\tau_{it}^{CN \to TH}$	-0.496	1.038	-0.127	1.504	1.682	-0.101	1.816*
	(0.603)	(1.157)	(1.486)	(1.010)	(1.068)	(0.747)	(1.040)
Observations	135,960	60,940	53,196	77,176	57,552	118,404	91,080
R-squared	0.756	0.658	0.616	0.673	0.685	0.704	0.701
HS6 x Quarter FE & Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes



Dynamic Specification

We extend the baseline specification by replacing the post-treatment indicator with a set of quarter-specific indicators.

$$y_{it}^{d} = \sum_{k=-1}^{4} \beta_{k}^{US \to CN} \left(\mathsf{Dur}_{it}^{k} \times \Delta \tau_{it}^{US \to CN} \right) + \sum_{k=-1}^{4} \beta_{k}^{CN \to US} \left(\mathsf{Dur}_{it}^{k} \times \Delta \tau_{it}^{CN \to US} \right) + \beta' \mathbf{X}_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}^{d},$$

$$(4)$$


- y_{it}^d log of export value to destination d for product i in quarter t
- Dur_{it}^k group quarters into yearly durations relative to the treatment period, $Dur^0 = 1$ if quarter t is within the first year post-treatment (i.e., quarters 0 to 3)
- \mathbf{X}_{it} includes tariff rates the U.S. and China imposed on Thai exports
- Time and product-by-quarter fixed effects

Empirical Results



Dynamic Effects of the U.S.-China Trade War

- \triangleright Exports to the U.S. exhibit a delayed but pronounced response to $\Delta \tau^{US \to CN}$.
- ▶ Thai goods may complement those U.S. tariffed products in China.



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Figure: US Export Responses to $\Delta \tau^{US \to CN}$

Figure: China Export Responses to $\Delta au^{ extit{CN} o extit{US}}$



Heterogenous Effects of U.S. Tariffs on the U.S. Exports

► Thai exports serve as substitutes for non-commodity manufactured goods, demonstrating significant impact only for capital goods within strategic industries in the U.S. market.




Figure: Heterogenous Effects of $\Delta \tau^{US \to CN}$: Export to the U.S.



Heterogenous Effects of U.S. Tariffs on ASEAN Exports

► The trade war may have strengthened regional supply chain integration, as Thailand exports more raw material inputs within high-technology manufacturing good sectors.




Figure: Heterogenous Effects of $\Delta \tau^{US \to CN}$: Export to ASEAN



Heterogenous Effects of CN Retaliation on China Exports

China decreases imports of non-commodity and non-strategic manufacturing goods from Thailand.




Figure: Heterogenous Effects of $\Delta \tau^{\mathit{CN} \to \mathit{US}}$: Export to China

Heterogeneity

Heterogenous Effects of CN Retaliation on ASEAN Exports

 Greater exports of Thai agricultural products to ASEAN (maybe later channeled into China)




Figure: Heterogenous Effects of $\Delta \tau^{\mathit{CN} \to \mathit{US}}$: Export to ASEAN



Rising Trend of U.S. Exports and Chinese Imports

► Thailand may be serving as a link in the supply chain for Chinese products or a route for the transshipment of Chinese goods to the U.S.




Figure: Thai Export Share to the U.S. and Import Share from China



Regression Specification

► Test whether imports from China become more aligned with exports to the U.S. for tariffed products in the post-tariff period.

$$y_{it}^{US} = \beta_{1} \left(im_{st}^{CN} \times \text{Tariffed}_{i}^{US \to CN} \times \text{Post}_{it} \right) + \beta_{2} \left(im_{st}^{CN} \times \text{Tariffed}_{i}^{US \to CN} \right)$$

$$+ \beta_{3} im_{st}^{CN} + \beta_{4} \left(\text{Tariffed}_{i}^{US \to CN} \times \text{Post}_{it} \right) + \beta \cdot \mathbf{X}_{it} + \epsilon_{it},$$
(5)

- Tariffed $_i^{US \to CN}$ the dummy variable for tariffed products
- im^{CN}_{st} log of imports from China at the HS-6 or HS-2 levels
 - ⇒ HS-6 to examine product transshipment
 - ⇒ HS-2 for potential supply chain linkages



Transshipment and Supply Chain Effects

Larger roles of product transshipment from China through Thailand

Table: Evidence of Transshipment and Supply Chain Effects

Log Exports to the U.S. at HS6	Import from China s=HS6 s=HS2		
· CN			
im_{st}^{CN}	0.031	-0.022	
	(0.049)	(0.021)	
$im_{st}^{CN} imes Tariffed_i^{\mathit{US} o \mathit{CN}}$	-0.039	0.013	
	(0.051)	(0.023)	
$im_{st}^{CN} imes Tariffed_{i}^{\mathit{US} o \mathit{CN}} imes Post_{it}$	0.062***	0.038***	
	(0.012)	(0.009)	
$Tariffed_i^{\mathit{US} o \mathit{CN}} imes Post_{it}$	-0.724***	-0.542**	
•	(0.252)	(0.259)	
Observations	60,940	60,940	
R-squared	0.658	0.658	
HS6 x Quarter FE & Time FE	Yes	Yes	



- ▶ Robust evidence of trade diversion: Thailand experienced a substantial increase in exports to the U.S. and ASEAN.
- ► The positive effects on US exports emerged with a delay and varied across sectors, while potentially reflecting transshipment of Chinese products.
- Negative responses of exports to China to retaliatory actions

To do next:

- Further identify trade war impact channels, particularly via supply chain linkages.
- ▶ Deepen analysis of trade war impact heterogeneity across sectors
- Conduct granular firm-level analysis: extensive vs. intensive margins, firm nationality.

Conclusion 2