



# The 2018 US-China Trade War and Trade Diversion: Evidence from Thai Customs Data

Nuwat Nookhwun<sup>1</sup>, Jettawat Pattararangrong<sup>1</sup>, Kittichai Saelee<sup>2</sup>, Wisarut Suwanprasert<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Puey Ungphakorn Institute for Economic Research, Bank of Thailand

<sup>2</sup>Thammasat University

<sup>3</sup>Middle Tennessee State University

September 26, 2025

NSD-INSE-PIER Macroeconomics Workshop

The opinions and assessments expressed in this presentation do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of Thailand and Puey Ungphakorn Institute for Economic Research.

- ▶ The 2018 U.S.–China trade war significantly disrupted global trade flows, creating substantial uncertainty for exporters worldwide.
  - ⇒ Elevated tariffs covered 360 and 110 billion dollars of Chinese and U.S. exports.
  - ⇒ Continued over Biden administration
- ▶ While much attention has focused on the U.S. and China, spillover effects on third countries are less well understood.
  - ⇒ Bystander countries may gain or lose from the trade war, depending on degrees of product substitutability and production responses (Fajgelbaum et al., 2024).
  - ⇒ Thailand emerges as an interesting study case due to high trade dependency and large trade with both the U.S. and China.

- ▶ We investigate how Thailand's exports responded to bilateral tariff shocks using detailed customs data from 2013–2023.
- ▶ Our analysis exploits cross-product variations in tariff exposure to identify the spill-over effects on Thailand's exports to major destinations.
- ▶ This paper also examines:
  - Dynamic responses of Thai exports
  - Product heterogeneity
  - Whether export reactions reflect potential transshipment or supply chain link with China

## Preview of Empirical Results

- ▶ Significant **trade diversion effects due to U.S. tariffs** on Chinese products, which raised Thai exports to the U.S., but with some delay
- ▶ Larger effects for manufacturing goods in **electronic and transportation sectors**, i.e., goods with high participation in GVCs.
- ▶ Suggestive **evidence of both transshipment** of Chinese goods to the U.S. and **supply-chain integration** with China
- ▶ Rather limited spillover effects from China retaliation

- ▶ This paper mainly contributes to the literature on **third-country spillovers** of trade policy shocks.
  - ⇒ Global reallocation: Fajgelbaum et al (2024), Alfaro and Chor (2023)
- ▶ On supply chain links to China & potential transshipment: Freund et al (2024), Iyoha et al (2024), Hayakawa (2024), Utar et al (2023)
- ▶ Impact of trade war on the U.S. and Chinese economies:
  - ⇒ The U.S.: Amiti et al (2020), Fajgelbaum et al (2020), Handley et al (2020)
  - ⇒ China: Jiao et al.(2024)

# Overview of the 2018 U.S.–China Trade War

- From July 6, 2018, the U.S. implemented five waves of tariff hikes against China.





Figure: U.S.–China Tariff Rates from Bown (2021)

# Thai Exports by Major Destinations

- ▶ Since 2018, exports to the U.S. have strongly expanded from roughly 10% to almost 20%.



- ▶ **Thai exports data:** from Customs Database
  - We aggregate these transaction-level data into annual data at the HS-6 product level (3,765 products).
- ▶ **U.S.-China tariff data:** from Fajgelbaum et al. (2024) and Bown (2021)
  - For each HS-6 product  $i$ , we compute weighted averages of the 10-digit or 8-digit tariff rates end of 2019 relative to the pre-war period.

$$\Delta \tau_i^{US \rightarrow CN} = \sum_{j \in i} w_{j,1317}^{US \leftarrow CN} \Delta \tau_j^{US \rightarrow CN} \quad (1)$$

$$\Delta \tau_i^{CN \rightarrow US} = \sum_{j \in i} w_{j,17}^{CN \leftarrow US} \Delta \tau_j^{CN \rightarrow US} \quad (2)$$

- $w_{j,1317}^{US \leftarrow CN}$  - the share of U.S. imports of Chinese products within the corresponding HS-6 product category ( $w_{j,17}^{CN \leftarrow US}$  - share of Chinese imports of U.S. products).



# Additional Tariffs from the 2018 U.S.–China Trade War

- ▶ U.S. tariff exposure, mostly at 25%, exceeds that of China across all sectors.
- ▶ Significant variations in additional tariffs within and across industries




Figure: U.S. tariffs:  $\Delta\tau^{US \rightarrow CN}$




Figure: China tariffs:  $\Delta\tau^{CN \rightarrow US}$

- ▶ Panel regression at the HS-6 product-year level to be estimated for each destination

$$EX_{it}^d = \beta_1^d \left( \text{Post}_{it} \times \Delta \tau_i^{US \rightarrow CN} \right) + \beta_2^d \left( \text{Post}_{it} \times \Delta \tau_i^{CN \rightarrow US} \right) + \beta \cdot \mathbf{X}_{it} + \epsilon_{it}^d, \quad (3)$$

- $EX_{it}^d$  - log of export value to destination  $d$  for product  $i$  in year  $t$
  - $\text{Post}_t$  - the dummy variable for the period that product  $i$  faces tariff hikes
  - $\mathbf{X}_{it}$  includes tariff rates the destination country imposes on Thai exports
  - Time and product fixed effects
- ▶ Focus on four export destinations: U.S., China, ASEAN and ROW

# Export Responses to the U.S.–China Trade War

- ▶ Thai exports may gain from the Trade War, as Thai goods substitute for Chinese products in the U.S. market.

**Table:** The Effect of U.S.–China Trade War on Thai Exports by Destination.

	Total	U.S.	China	ASEAN	ROW
$\text{Post}_{it} \times \Delta\tau_i^{US \rightarrow CN}$	0.396* (0.220)	0.744* (0.386)	0.454 (0.462)	0.367 (0.238)	0.515* (0.303)
$\text{Post}_{it} \times \Delta\tau_i^{CN \rightarrow US}$	0.284 (0.258)	0.043 (0.402)	-0.564 (0.526)	0.231 (0.302)	0.125 (0.351)
Direct Tariff <sub>it</sub>	0.629 (0.527)	-1.527** (0.735)	-2.366*** (0.824)	0.294 (0.311)	0.742* (0.397)
Observations	33,990	15,235	13,299	29,601	22,770
R-squared	0.868	0.814	0.793	0.822	0.824
HS6 FEs & Time FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

- We extend the baseline specification by replacing the post-treatment indicator with a set of year-specific indicators.

$$EX_{it}^d = \sum_{k=-3}^4 \beta_k^{US \rightarrow CN} \left( \text{Dur}_{it}^k \times \Delta \tau_i^{US \rightarrow CN} \right) + \sum_{k=-3}^4 \beta_k^{CN \rightarrow US} \left( \text{Dur}_{it}^k \times \Delta \tau_i^{CN \rightarrow US} \right) + \beta' \mathbf{X}_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}^d, \quad (4)$$

- $EX_{it}^d$  - log of export value to destination  $d$  for product  $i$  in year  $t$
- $\text{Dur}_{it}^k$  - the dummy variables indicating the number of years relative to the treatment period
- $\mathbf{X}_{it}$  includes tariff rates the destination country imposes on Thai exports
- Time and product fixed effects

# Dynamic Effects of the U.S.–China Trade War

- Exports to the U.S. exhibit a delayed but pronounced response to  $\Delta\tau^{US \rightarrow CN}$ .




Figure: US Export Responses to  $\Delta\tau^{US \rightarrow CN}$




Figure: China Export Responses to  $\Delta\tau^{CN \rightarrow US}$

# Heterogeneous Effects of U.S. Tariffs on the U.S. Exports

- Larger, significant impact found in the machinery & electrical & transportation sectors.




Figure: Heterogeneous Effects of  $\Delta\tau^{US \rightarrow CN}$ : Export to the U.S.

# Heterogeneous Effects of U.S. Tariffs on ASEAN Exports

- ▶ The trade war may have strengthened regional supply chain integration, as Thailand exports more raw material inputs to ASEAN.




Figure: Heterogeneous Effects of  $\Delta\tau^{US \rightarrow CN}$ : Export to ASEAN

## Underlying factors

- ▶ Explore three potential factors to explain positive responses of exports to U.S.:
  - Comparative advantage of Thai products in the U.S. or global markets  
→ Use Revealed Comparative Advantage index
  - China's lost market share in U.S. market  
→ Dummy = 1 if product  $i$ 's lost market share > average
  - Supply chain integration with China or ASEAN  
→ Use Grubel-Lloyd index of intra-industry trade



# Underlying factors: Results

**Table:** Effects of U.S. Tariffs on the U.S. Exports by Product Characteristics.

	Dum=RCA <sup>US</sup>	Dum=RCA <sup>Global</sup>	Dum=CN Loss	Intra-industry trade with China	Intra-industry trade with ASEAN
$Post_{it} \times \Delta\tau_i^{US \rightarrow CN}$	0.483 (0.420)	0.755* (0.435)	0.594 (0.409)	0.334 (0.441)	0.139 (0.497)
$Post_{it} \times \Delta\tau_i^{US \rightarrow CN} \times Dum_i$	0.605* (0.327)	-0.021 (0.326)	0.335 (0.342)		
$Post_{it} \times \Delta\tau_i^{US \rightarrow CN} \times GII_i$				1.422** (0.635)	1.221** (0.615)
Observations	15,235	15,235	15,235	15,224	15,235
R-squared	0.814	0.814	0.814	0.814	0.814
HS6 FEs & Time FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

# Products with Strong Export Growth After Trade War

**Table:** Products with Large Contributions to Growth of Exports to US (2017–2023)

HS-6 Code	Description	Growth Rate
854140	SOLAR PANELS	660%
851762	TELEPHONE SETS	425%
850440	ELECTRICAL STATIC CONVERTERS	474%
401120	RUBBER NEW PNEUMATIC TIRES	263%
847150	DIGITAL PROCESSING UNITS	803%
852580	TV CAMERAS, DIGITAL CAMERA	178%
847330	PARTS FOR AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING MACHINES	135%
841510	AIR CONDITIONING MACHINES	490%
853710	BOARDS FOR ELECTRICITY CONTROL OR DISTRIBUTION	167%
854370	ELECTRICAL MACHINES WITH INDIVIDUAL FUNCTIONS	390%
870870	PARTS FOR MOTOR VEHICLES	856%
230910	DOG AND CAT FOOD	98%
100630	RICE	64%

# Rising Trend of Chinese Imports

- ▶ Thailand may be serving as a link in the supply chain for Chinese products or a route for the transshipment of Chinese goods to the U.S.




Figure: Thai Export Share to the U.S. and Import Share from China

## Firm-level analyses on the link with China

- ▶ Focus on firms that export products to the US market
- ▶ Construct **firm-level exposure** to the US-China trade war:

$$\Delta\tau_{f,t}^{US\rightarrow CN} = \frac{\sum_i EX_{i,1317}^f Post_{it} \Delta\tau_i^{US\rightarrow CN}}{\sum_i EX_{i,1317}^f} \quad (5)$$

$$\Delta\tau_{f,t}^{CN\rightarrow US} = \frac{\sum_i EX_{i,1317}^f Post_{it} \Delta\tau_i^{CN\rightarrow US}}{\sum_i EX_{i,1317}^f} \quad (6)$$

- ▶ And also firm exposure to US tariffs on Thai products:

$$\tau_{f,t}^{US\rightarrow TH} = \frac{\sum_i EX_{i,1317}^{f\rightarrow US} \tau_{it}^{US\rightarrow TH}}{\sum_i EX_{i,1317}^{f\rightarrow US}} \quad (7)$$

$$y_{f,t} = \beta_1 \Delta \tau_{f,t}^{US \rightarrow CN} + \beta_2 \Delta \tau_{f,t}^{CN \rightarrow US} + \beta \cdot \mathbf{X}_{it} + \gamma_f + \delta_t + \epsilon_{it} \quad (8)$$

► Dependent variables:

1. Firm  $f$ 's exports to the US,  $EX_t^{f \rightarrow US}$
2. Firm  $f$ 's **transshipment of Chinese products** to the US,  $\sum_i \min\{EX_{i,t}^{f \rightarrow US}, IM_{i,t}^{f \leftarrow CN}\}$
3. Firm  $f$ 's **imports of Chinese inputs**,  $\sum_k IM_{k,t}^{f \leftarrow CN}$ 
  - Product  $k$  must be raw material, intermediate goods or capital good and is not the same product that firm  $f$  exports to the US

# Transshipment and Supply Chain Effects

- Larger role of supply chain effects from China, while transshipment through Thailand occurs to some extent.

Table: Transshipment and Supply Chain Effects

	$EX^{US}$	Transshipment		Imports of Chinese Inputs		
		Value	Ratio to $EX^{US}$	Value	Ratio to $EX^{Total}$	Ratio to Revenue
$\Delta \tau_{f,t}^{US \rightarrow CN}$	10.811*** (1.119)	2.972*** (0.542)	0.060*** (0.022)	5.796*** (0.847)	0.137*** (0.032)	0.035*** (0.010)
$\Delta \tau_{f,t}^{CN \rightarrow US}$	-2.100* (1.162)	-1.089** (0.554)	-0.025 (0.023)	-2.878*** (0.817)	-0.008 (0.030)	0.014 (0.008)
Observations	78,672	76,616	76,616	76,616	76,616	62,808
R-squared	0.550	0.670	0.477	0.674	0.431	0.666
Firm FEs & Time FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

- ▶ Robust evidence of **trade diversion**: Thailand experienced a substantial increase in exports to the U.S..
- ▶ The positive effects on US exports emerged with a delay and varied across sectors, while potentially reflecting both **transshipment and supply chain links** with China.
- ▶ Limited responses of exports to China to retaliatory actions